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Summary  findings
Since the breakup of the USSR,  the South Caucasus  with the CIS countries and politically friendly neighbors,
region has experienced a range of political conflicts,  but too little with the European Union, the United States,
resulting in a number of hot and cold wars and border  and hostile neighbors. Lifting the blockades would
closures. Polyakov analyzes the probably short-term  alleviate trade distortions and bring about short-term
impacts of peace in the region as a result of a resolution  improvements, including:
of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the  *  More rational trade flows.
Nagorny Karabakh region and an end to the associated  *  A resumption of (or an increase in) regional trade in
trade blockades, with an emphasis on Armenia,  major commodities such as energy.
Azerbaijan, and Georgia.  * Lower prices or higher profit margins (or both) on
The conflict has seriously distorted trade flows in the  some important consumption and production  goods.
region, disrupted transport routes, and stifled export and  With peace, Armenia could more than double its
import opportunities  for Armenia and Azerbaijan.  exports if Azerbaijani and Turkish markets open, which
Georgia has enjoyed higher-than-normal transit through  could reduce Armenia's trade deficit by a third to a half
its territory. Trade has stopped in gas (from Azerbaijan  and increase its GDP by 30 percent. Improving transport
to Armenia) and electricity (from Armenia to Turkey).  routes would produce immediate savings and relieve
Transport tariffs are unusually high, aggravated by  pressure on domestic prices, especially for energy.
government-imposed transit fees (taxes).  Azerbaijan could increase its exports by $100 million,
Over time, trade restrictions have eased and trading  or 11 percent of 1999 levels, reducing its trade deficit by
partners have found ways to conduct trade despite closed  a quarter and raising its GDP by 5 percent. Its exports
borders and blockades-but  at a cost.  and imports would benefit from transport  savings.
Applying a gravity model to regional trade, Polyakov  Transit through Georgia might decline, but probably
concludes that South Caucasus countries trade enough  not by more than a quarter of the freight service surplus.
This paper-a  product of Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region-
is part of a larger effort in the region to explore growth prospects in the CIS economies. Copies of the paper are available
free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please  contact Zakia Nekaien-Nowrouz, room H4-
246,  telephone  202-473-9057,  fax 202-619-1197,  email address znekaiennowrouz@worldbank.org.  Policy Research
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.  The author may be contacted at evpolyakov
@yahoo.com. April 2001.  (42 pages)
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41. Introduction
This study examines the likely short-term impacts of the resolution of Nagorny
Karabakh and other regional conflicts, and the consequences of lifting the associated
economic blockade on international trade in the South Caucasus region, with
concentration on Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.  The examination of short-term
impacts includes the analysis of missing exports, opportunities for export creation, and
transport savings.  Although some longer-term prospects are explored, the paper does not
attempt to quantify them.  In addition, it does not investigate prospects for FDI increase in
the region and associated benefits for growth and mutual trade.  It also does not attempt to
estimate economic losses associated with inadequate transport and trade infrastructure.1
Since the breakup of the USSR, the South Caucasus region has experienced a
range of political conflicts resulting in a number of hot and cold wars and border closures.
In this paper, we will examine the trade impacts of the following conflicts:
*  A decade old dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorny Karabakh
region had led to a war between the two countries.  In 1994, the armistice was reached
but the borders between the two countries are closed and trade, officially, does not
exist;
*  Seriously strained relations between Turkey and Armenia dating back to the events of
WWI, when large numbers of Armenian population perished triggering a mass exodus
out of the country. Currently, the Turkish-Armenian border is closed; trade takes a
circuitous route via Georgia and is well below its potential;
- Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflict within Georgia. These two Georgian provinces
declared independence in the early 1990's and, after the wars, defacto  retained it.
The borders between the provinces and the Georgian mainland are closed;
*  Chechnia conflict within Russia.  The province declared independence in the early
1990's.  After two wars, however, the central authorities have regained control over it
in 1999. The borders have been opened but internal disorder in the province hampers
trade.
The detailed account of the impact of the closed borders on the trade routes and
transport costs is given in Sections 2.4 and 3.3.
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the current trade patterns,
including trade volumes and BOP of each of the three South Caucasus countries, partner
arrangements, commodity flows, the geography of trade, and trade regimes.  Chapters 3
and 4 seek to assess the different aspects of economic losses in trade arising from the
conflicts.  They also try to evaluate trading outcomes if full political reconciliation is
achieved in the region, including export creation, transport savings, impacts on price
These  issues  have been  addressed  in the World  Bank  report  Trade  Facilitation  (2000).
5levels, and regional competition.  Chapter 3 deals with non-energy trade and applies a
gravity model to evaluate missing exports and to put into perspective current trade
pattems.  Chapter 4 is dedicated to trade in energy. Chapter 5 summarizes the previous
results in the framework of the BOP.  Chapter 6 takes up an issue of possibly adding the
South-North flows to the currently dominant East-West flows. Chapter 7 provides
conclusions.
2.  Current Trade Patterns
2.1.  Trade Volumes and Balances
All three Caucasus countries run high trade deficits (see Table 1 below).  The
deficit-to-exports ratios have been very high in Armenia and Georgia during the whole
period - from 162 to 252 percent in Armenia and from 162 to 232 percent in Georgia.
The Azerbaijani deficit has been lower - between 40 and 154 percent of exports.  In
1999, breaking the adverse trend, the trade deficits of all three countries shrank.
Over the past four years, Armenian and Georgian exports were stagnant, while
Azerbaijani exports increased by 60 percent, thanks to large foreign investments in the oil
sector.
Table 1.  Trade Volumes and Balances in South Caucasus, 1995-99
(UJS  Dollars  Million)
1996  1997  1998  1999
Armenia:
Exports  290,3  232,5  220,5  231,7
Imports  855,8  892,3  902,4  811.3
Trade Balance  -565,5  -659,8  -681,9  -579.6
As % of exports  -162  -240  -252  -227
Azerbaiian:
Exports  643.7  808.3  677.8  1,025.2
Inports  1,337.6  1,375.2  1,723.9  1,433.4
Trade Balance  -693.9  -566.9  -1,046.2  -408.2
As % of exports  -108  -70  -154  -40
Georgia:
Exports  310.0  376.5  300.0  329.6
Imports  897.5  1,162.8  994.5  863.4
Trade Balance  -587.5  -786.3  -694.6  -533.9
As % of exports  -190  -209  -232  -162
Sources: National Statistical Agencies ofArmenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
6Table 2.  Share of Selected Partners in Exports, 1994,1998
(Percent)
Armenia  Azerbaijan  Georgia
1994
Armenia  X  --  8.5
Azerbaijan  --  X  9.7
Georgia  1.3  2.5  X
Russia  38.9  21.4  34.0
Other CIS  33.1  18.2  24.2
Turkey  0.1  2.5  14.9
Iran  6.8  39.4  3.2
UAE  0.1  0.1  0.0
EU  16.4  12.8  0.9
USA and Canada  0.2  0.0  1.3
Rest of world  3.4  3.1  4.5
1998
Armenia  X  --  0.6
Azerbaijan  --  X  9.6
Georgia  4.3  12.7  X
Russia  18.1  17.5  28.7
Other CIS  14.1  8.1  16.8
Turkey  1.4  22.4  10.5
Iran  14.2  14.2  1.3
UAE  1.7  0.5  0.2
EU  34.6  21.7  19.1
USA and Canada  5.4  1.4  5.9
Rest of world  11.6  2.9  13.1
Change between 1994 and 1998
Armenia  X  --  -7.9
Azerbaijan  --  X  -0.1
Georgia  3.0  10.2  X
Russia  -20.8  -3.9  -5.3
Other CIS  -18.9  -10.1  -7.4
Turkey  1.3  19.9  -4.4
Iran  7.4  -25.2  -1.9
UAE  1.6  0.4  0.2
EU  18.2  8.9  18.2
USA and Canada  5.2  1.4  4.6
Rest of world  3.1  -1.6  4.0
Source: Statistical Yearbook of South Caucasus, 2000.
7Table 2:  Share of Selected Partners in Imports, 1994, 1998 (Contd.)
(Percent)
Armenia  Azerbaijan  Georgia
1994
Armenia  X  --  0.3
Azerbaijan  --  X  7.0
Georgia  4.5  1.0  X
Russia  28.5  15.1  7.9
Other  CIS  19.2  46.4  *  65.5  *
Turkey  0.1  9.8  11.4
Iran  10.8  8.6  0.2
UAE  0.3  1.2  0.0
EU  9.4  9.0  3.6
USA and Canada  24.5  0.0  1.5
Rest of world  2.7  8.9  2.6
1998
Armenia  X  --  1.1
Azerbaijan  --  X  8.3
Georgia  3.0  2.3  X
Russia  21.2  18.0  14.8
Other CIS  1.3  17.3  6.0
Turkey  6.3  20.4  11.1
Iran  7.1  4.0  0.6
UAE  6.0  4.2  2.2
EU  27.8  20.8  31.0
USA and Canada  11.3  4.0  8.7
Rest of world  27.3  13.0  24.9
Change between 1994 and 1998
Armenia  X  --  0.8
Azerbaijan  --  X  1.3
Georgia  -1.5  1.3  X
Russia  -7.3  2.9  6.9
Other CIS  -17.9  -29.1  -59.5
Turkey  6.2  10.6  -0.3
Iran  -3.7  -4.6  0.4
UAE  5.7  3.0  2.2
EU  18.4  11.8  27.3
USA and Canada  -13.2  4.0  7.2
Rest of world  13.3  0.1  13.6
Source: Statistical Yearbook of South Caucasus, 2000.
* The largest partner was Turkmenistan (energy).
82.2. Main  Trading  Partners  and Overall  Effects of Blockades
The main trading partners of the South Caucasus countries are Russia, other CIS
countries, Turkey, Iran, the UAE, the EU, the USA and Canada.  Their shares in trade
flows between 1994 (the year of the ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan) and 1998
are presented in Table 2.
The shares changed as follows:
Exports
Armenia has been withdrawing gradually from the Russian and other CIS markets,
while increasing its trade presence in the EU and Iran.  The share of exports to the EU has
grown thanks to the diamond processing industry (with a high import content).  This
operation, however, generates only 15 percent value added. Iran buys from Armenia
scrap metal, copper concentrate and electric power (on a swap basis).  Armenia's exports
to its other neighbors are relatively small.
Despite a loss of market share, Russia and the CIS remained a major exports
market for Armenian goods absorbing brandy, synthetic rubber, and engineering products.
Azerbaijan has drastically reduced the share of its exports to Iran and other CIS
countries (excluding Russia and the Caucasus) while increasing the share of Turkey and
Georgia. The only exception is energy products, which remained an important export to
the CIS countries.
Georgia has increased its EU share at the expense of all other partners.  Still,
Russia, other CIS countries, Turkey, and Azerbaijan remain its important partners.
All three countries have increased their share of exports to North America.
However, this represents a modest figure in overall exports.
No trade has been officially recorded between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Imports
Armenia has increased the shares of imports from the EU and Turkey, and it has
reduced the shares from Russia and the CIS. The main import countries in 1998 were
Russia, the EU, Iran, and, somewhat unexpectedly, Turkey. The latter does not have
official trade relations with Annenia, and its exports go through intermediate addresses in
Georgia. The share of import from North America has declined dramatically from 24.5
percent to 11.3 percent.  At the same time, the value of North American imports has not
changed much. It stood at 96.1 million dollars in 1994 and at 96.3 million dollars in 1998.
The effect can be attributed to the rising overall value of imports and the relative decline
of humanitarian aid in imports.
9Azerbaijan has reduced the share of its imports from other CIS countries, and it
has increased the shares from the EU and Turkey.
Georgia has reduced the imports from other CIS countries in favor of the EU and
the rest of the world, including North America, which provides a large amount of
humanitarian aid.
In the last half decade, in spite of economic blockades and closed borders, trade
flows have tended towards gradual normalization.  The only exception is the lack of
official trade relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  Even in this case, anecdotal
evidence indicates that some unofficial trade between these two countries is taking root
Economic blockades and closed borders are far less rigid than one would have imagined
in the early 1990s.
The general effect of blockades can be illustrated by the dynamics of the overall
freight factor (the ratio of freight costs to the value of merchandise) in the BOPs of the
South Caucasus countries.
As shown in Table 3, Armenia registers the highest freight factor; it is lower in
Azerbaijan, and even lower in Georgia.  This is not surprising, as Armenia is the most
geographically isolated country; it also suffers the most from the regional blockades.  The
factor shows high year-to-year fluctuation due to the changes in the commodity
composition of trade.  For instance, a rapid growth of the diamond exports from Armenia
(with high value-to-weight ratio) was a major factor behind the decrease in the freight
factor.
The slope of tne linear time trend (y = a + bt) presented in the last column shows
that Armenia, which suffered the most from the blockade, has had the most pronounced,
and statistically significant, tendency towards the decrease of the freight factor over time.
The blockades have eased a bit, and the flow of goods has found ways around existing
obstacles.
Trend coefficients for Azerbaijan and Georgia countries have large standard errors
making the results ambiguous.  (The Azerbaijani freight factor has also declined, while
Georgian has increased.)
Table 3.  The overall freight factors in the South Caucasus countries, 1995-99
(Percent)
Change  Slope of  Standard
between  linear time  errorfior
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  first  and  trend  slope
last year  (y = a + bt)
Armenia  12.0  11.3  12.3  10.1  9.3  -2.7  -0.67  0.26
Azerbaijan  10.5  8.6  9.4  13.5  7.4  -3.1  -0.14  0.83
Georgia  N/A  7.9  3.9  8.2  8.3  0.3  0.53  1.10
10Source: The author's calculations based on the national BOPs.
Note: The overallfreight factor  is the ratio of freight costs (defined as the sum offreight
debit and credit) to merchandize value (the sum of merchandize debit and credit) in the
balance ofpayments.
The freight factors in the South Caucasus are high though not impossibly high by
international standards.  For instance, the following countries had similar or higher freight
factors in 1995 (in percent): Bahrain - 14.5, Kuwait - 13.8, Bulgaria - 9.7, Poland - 9.3,
Ukraine - 8.42. The freight factor in each Caucasus country is, however, much higher
than in the EU, where it stands at 1.5 percent.  The restrictions placed on the movement
of goods explain in part the generally high freight factor in the FSU; other significant
factors include high cost of transporting goods due to inefficient transportation systems
and long distances between trading hubs.
The gradual easement of the blockades over the last five to seven years can be
attributed to:
Increased political stability in Georgia, which has allowed it to become a major
transit route for Armenian exports and imports;
*  Increased cooperation with Iran, which has increased its role as a transit country;
*  Optimization of trade flows and routes due to the improved efficiency of regional
trade, gained trading experience, and the increased knowledge of markets and trading
partners.
The early assumptions of a prolonged and severe economic blockade made a few
years ago had led to some costly, uneconomic decisions. One such example is the
construction of a large freight terminal at Zvartnots airport (Yerevan), which was
financed by an EBRD loan in the amount of US$22.8 million. The demand for air cargo
transportation, which was based on the assumption about a strict international blockade of
Armenia, has turned out to be significantly lower than the initial estimate.  As such, the
terminal currently operates at below 20 percent capacity.
Nevertheless, closed borders and blockades still inflict economic losses and lead
to a suboptimal geography of trade in the region.
2.3.  Main Commodity Flows
The main commodity flows among Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia and their
main trading partners, Turkey, Russia, and Iran, are presented in Table 4.
2  Source: A Review  of Statistics  on  Trade Flows  in Services  (1997).  Note that oil exporters in the samnple
have very  high  freight  factors  due  to the high  costs  of the transport  of oil to distant  markets.
11Table 4. Main commodity flows in the South Caucasus, 1999
(The coverage of the relevant tradeflow,  in percent, is presented in parenthesis)
Exporting  Importing countries
countries  _.
Armenia  Azerbaijan  Georgia  Iran  Russia  Turkey
Armenia  X  Electricity,  Electricity,  Liqueur,  Raw
cement,  scrap metals,  synthetic  animal
liqueur (71  copper  rubber,  hides
%)  concentrate  ferro-  and
(66 %)  molybde-  skins
num alloy  (72 %)
(44 %)  _  -
Azerbaijan  X  Crude oil  Diesel,  Electricity,  Diesel,
and oil  aluminum  tobacco,  plastics,
products  scrap  crude oil  crude oil
(86 %)  (74 %)  (60 %)  (69 %)
Georgia  Oil pro-  Electricity,  X  Lathes,  Wines,  Scrap
ducts,  ferrous  machinery  ferro-alloys,  metals,
wheat,  metals and  and machine-  tea  wood
gas,  articles,  tools, steel  (67 %)  (rough
sawn-  cement  products  and
wood  (63 %)  (58 %)  sawn),
(33 %)  sunflow
er seed
_(64  %)
Iran  Electri-  Electricity,  Constructio  X  N/A  N/A
city,  processed  n machines,
process-  food  furniture, oil
ed food,  (56 %)  products,
oil  asphalt,
products  passenger
(42 %)  cars
_  (51  %)
Wheat,  N/A  X  N/A
Natural  flour,
gas,  cement,  Natural gas,
nuclear  wood  pharmace-
fuel  (sawn or  uticals
(55  chipped)  (58 %)
Russia  percent)  (48 °/O)  _
12Table  4.  Main  commodity  flows in the South  Caucasus,  1999  (Contd.)
(The coverage of the relevant trade flow, in percent,  is presented in parenthesis)
Exporting  Importing countries
countries
Armenia  Azerbaijan  Georgia  Iran  Russia  Turkey
Cigarettes,  Machinery and  Processed  N/A  N/A  N/A
oil pro-  mechanisms,  food,
ducts,  processed food  chemicals,
processed  (53 %)  apparel




Turkey  I  I_I  I  I
Sources: National Statistical Agencies of Armenia, Azerbaian,  Georgia, and Russia.
N/A: Not applicable  for  the purposes of this report.
The table shows that the South Caucasus countries export primarily energy,
mineral resources, and semi-finished products.  Armenia exports copper and molybdenum
concentrate. Azerbaijan exports oil and gas.  The scrap of ferrous and non-ferrous metals,
released in the process of the physical dismantling of the Soviet industrial infrastructure,
is among the most important exports.  Some ex-Soviet industries continue to operate in
the region, including Armenia's chemical industry, Georgia's metallurgy, and
Azerbaijan's oil refinery; the outputs of these industries enter regional trade.  Agricultural
and forest products (such as animal skins in Armenia, wood and sunflower seed in
Georgia) are also traded.  In the last decade, the exports of agricultural products have
decreased, and the exports of industrial products (especially, light industry and
machinery) have collapsed, along with the collapse of regional industry.  Despite
transport disadvantages, products with low value-to-weight ratio continue to dominate the
exports of the South Caucasus countries.
The South Caucasus countries import energy, cereals (a lot of which are offered as
humanitarian aid), processed food, consumer goods, and machinery.
2.4. Geography  of Trade and Transport  Costs
This section describes the prevailing trade routes between the three South
Caucasus countries and their main trading partners.  It also looks at associated transport
and handling costs.  Energy trade is relegated to the dedicated chapter.  Table 5 presents
various transport costs within and outside the region.




Armenia  Azerbaijan  Georgia  [ran  Russia  Turkey
Armenia  X  300 - 20'  500 -700  3,100-
rail, 500 - 20t truck  3,500 --
20' fo.b.  (Tehran)  20' road,
vessel  1,200 -20'  2,800 --
(Bandar-  20' rail (to
Abbas)  Moscow)
Georgia  17/t - $ 500 - 550 - 20',  3,000 --  15-20,'t
general  700 - 20',  700 -40'  20 t truck  (general
cargo,  12-13/t  (r/t, Poti - (Sverd-  cargo incl.
30-32/t  (general  Tbilisi)  lovsk)  port
- wheat,  cargo, rail,  charges)

































Armenia  Azerbaija  Georgia  Iran  Russia  Turkey




Turkey  2,300 for  3,500 - 15-20/t  N/A  N/A  X
20t truck  13 t  (general
(from  trailer,  cargo incl.
Istanbul),  3,000 - port
20',  charges),
3,500-  2,700-
40' (road  20', 3,300







Sources: Author's interviews with transportation and trade companies in the region.
N/A -- Not applicable  for  the purposes of this report; 20' and 40' - 20 and 40  foot
container.
Note: Transport costs between some other  important destinations  are listed below:
Dubai - Baku: $ 1,800-2,1 00for 20' and $ 2,900-3,000for  40' container, West Europe-
Baku: $ 3,000for 40' container, or $ 3-5/kg (road), $ 2,000-$2,50 for a 60t wagon
(railway); Poti - Europe: $ 1,500  for 20 '  $ 2,000for  40 ',*  Europe -- Poti: $ 1,200  for
20', $ 1,500for 40', Poti - USA (Northeast): $ 2,200-2,400for  20',  $ 3,000-3,400for
40';  Yerevan - Europe: $3,000-3,500for  20', 4,000for  20t truck; Europe - Yerevan: $
6,000 - 7,000for 20t track; Yerevan - Los Angeles: $ 3,600for  20', $ 4,900for  40';
Ilyichevsk (Ukraine) - Yerevan: $ 3,400  for  a 60t wagon.
Trade between Armenia  and Georgia utilizes railroads and roads on the common
border.  There are no trade barriers arising from conflicts.  On the contrary, the Nagorny
Karabakh resulted in the emergence of Georgia as the only conduit for Armenian trade
with much of the world, including Turkey, Russia, Europe, and overseas.  Georgia is
likely to see its transit significance weaken if the regional borders open.
Trade between Armenia  and Iran flows via road through Megri (an Armenian
town on the Iranian border).  A shorter route through the Nakhichevan region in
Azerbaijan is closed, resulting in extra transport costs.
15Since the border between Anmenia and Turkey is officially closed, trade goods
between the two countries are sent via Georgia. That is, Turkish goods delivered to
Armenia are rerouted through a Georgian intermediary.  In Georgia, the stated destination
is switched to Armnenia.  The same scheme works in the opposite direction. This
procedure does not allow trade in construction materials (due to high transport costs) and
energy.
Poti serves as the main regional seaport and is linked by a railway with all three
countries.  The most economic mode for general cargo to Armnenia  would be maritime to
Poti followed by railway.  Containers are transported primarily by road rather than by
railway due to time efficiency and better reliability.
Trade goods between Armenia  and Russia travel by railway via Azerbaijan and
by road via Georgia. Gas and power lines link the two countries through Georgia.
When using the railway through Azerbaijan, the consignments are assigned to a
Georgian intermediary, a scheme that is used in the trade between Armenia and Turkey.
There is no recorded trade between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  There is some
anecdotal evidence on informal trade between the two countries, either via Georgian
intermediate addresses or across the border, mainly in energy, agricultural, and
consumption products.  However, the volume of this trade remains small.
Trade between Azerbaijan and Georgia goes directly by railways and roads. There
are gas and oil pipelines between the two countries.  The routes are not affected by
regional conflicts.
Trade between Azerbaijan and Iran is conducted across their common border and
does not suffer from the conflicts.
Trade between Azerbaijan and Turkey must traverse either Georgia or Iran. There
is a shorter road via Armenia, the use of which would bring transport costs down.
General cargo delivered by ship still have to go through Poti.
Azerbaijan and Russia trade across their common border.  The problems of
trading that arose with the Chechen conflict in Russia were resolved in 1999 with the
completion of rail and pipeline links bypassing Chechnia.
Georgia and Turkev share a common border on the Black Sea.  Trade routes are
not negatively affected by area conflicts.
Trade between Georgia and Russia flows directly by sea and by road or by
railroad via Azerbaijan; energy flows by direct pipelines and energy lines.  The closed
railway on the east coat of the Black Sea (due to the Abkhazia conflict) has a minor effect
16on cargo flows, since that railway was designed and used for primarily passenger
transportation.
Railway tariffs. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the CIS countries
switched from the Soviet tariff system to international tariffs, based on the NTT tariff
system 3. At the same time, in order to slash the cost of long-haul transit, a number of CIS
countries concluded separate agreements to lower the NTT tariffs.  Georgia, Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan entered into the Xerox and Baku agreements, which allow
a 50 percent tariff reduction for all goods travelling between those four countries.
Georgia and Armenia bilaterally agreed to a 25 percent tariff reduction for shipments
within the two countries.  As a result, tariffs for Armenia on the Georgian railway are 25
percent higher than those for the Xerox/Baku agreement participants.  If Armenia joins,
the tariffs for its transit will be reduced accordingly.
There are two major problems with the railway tariff schedules.  First, the
effective tariffs are often set with little regard to international agreements, since private
and public transport providers in all Caucasus countries and Russia are not properly
regulated and are ridden with corruption.  Second, Armenia is not a member of the Xerox
and Baku agreements, which hampers its railway transport even if its shipments were
officially allowed to traverse the Azerbaijani territory.
Transit fees.  Armenia and Georgia levy high transit fees on foreign vehicles.
There is no transit fee in Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkey. However, all countries apply
transit quotas (the number of vehicles per year allowed to pass through the country's
territory, by nation).
Fee schedules are presented in the Annex.  According to the schedules, the most
common  carrier -- a truck with the capacity of 10-20 tons - transiting the Georgian
territory must pay $245 equivalent in local currency (at the October, 2000, exchange rate).
A similar vehicle transiting the Armenian territory must pay $197 equivalent, also in local
currency (total fee = $27.93 ecological charges + $20.00 cargo transit fee +
$148.98 vehicle transit fee). For the Georgia-bound cargo, the fee is raised by $80.
According to Table 5, transportation companies offer the following tariffs from
Georgia to Armenia: $300-350 for a 20 ton truck, $1,400 for a 20 foot container, and
$1,800 for a 40 foot container. Thus, the transit fee equals 70-82 percent of the tariff for
trucking, 18 percent for a 20 foot container, and 14 percent for a 40 foot container.
2.5.  Trade Regimes
There are three major trading blocks in the region:
*  the "free trade" agreements among the CIS countries;
3 The NTT international  tariff  agreerments,  in addition  to the CIS,  include  the Baltic and CEE  countries.
Formally,  the South  Caucasus  countries  did not sign the agreemnent.  However,  the NTT systems  is defacto
used for transit  in Azerbaijan  and  Georgia. Armenia  is not included  for political  reasons.
17*  the Customs Union of Armenia, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan; and
*  the Customs Union of Turkey and the EU.
Trade agreements among the CIS countries, although signed by all three Caucasus
republics, largely have not been effective. As a result, they have been supplemented by a
variety of bilateral and multilateral agreements. Georgia has concluded free trade
agreements with Arnenia,  Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Moldova.
These agreements stipulate zero import duties on the products from participating
countries.  However, these agreements have not been ratified by the Parliament of
Georgia. As a result, Georgia does not enjoy a zero import tariff and, in turn, levies ful
import tariffs on all CIS countries.  Annenia and Azerbaijan reciprocally waive import
tariffs and/or VAT for some CIS countries. Here is a telling example of the differential
treatment of the CIS countries under these arrangements. In Azerbaijan, imports from
Russia are subject to import tariffs and VAT; imports from Georgia and Ukraine - to
VAT only; and imports from Moldova - to import tariffs only. This situation create
powerful incentives to misreport the country of origin.
Even under full political normalization, the Caucasus exports to Turkey would be
subject to EU regulations, including special restrictions on agricultural products and the
wide use of quotas.  An example of one such restriction might be Armenia's textile
exports to the EU, which are free of quotas at this time.  According to an Armenian trade
official, this quota-free regime is mainly explained by small volumes of Armenian
exports and would change if the volumes increase significantly.
Georgia is a member of the WTO, Armenia is expected to join soon, and
Azerbaijan has been an observer with more remote prospects for full membership.  While
having an impact on import tariffs schedules, the WTO has had little other influence on
regional trade so far.
Trade regime.  The three South Caucasus countries levy import tariffs, VAT, and
excise tax on imports.  There are also (small) customs clearance fees.
Import tariffs. Armenia has a unified import tariff of ten percent; a number of
commodities are exempt (the majority of which are intermediate goods and food).  The
overall tariff level is rather low, with a weighted average tariff at four percent.
The Georgian import tariff schedule for 2000-05 has been approved by the WTO.
It has a variety of tariff levels gravitating toward 12 percent.
The Azerbaijani import tariff structure is more complicated. It has three tariff
levels: 15, 5, and 0 percent.  There is also a multitude of specific rates (usually expressed
in Euro per physical unit).  The tariffs do not look excessive and are on par with the
Georgian level.  Some tariff unification would help, however.
18In sum, import tariff levels in the Caucasus have not constituted an obstacle for
regional trade. However, tariff administration has been far from efficient, and the unclear
procedures of the custom valuation of goods has led to bribes.  As a result, importers have
not been treated equally.  There are three categories of importers: (i) paying statutory
tariffs, (ii) paying bribes and a part of statutory tariffs, and (iii) smugglers paying only
bribes.
The problems with corruption have been most pronounced in Azerbaijan.  Georgia
has also experienced similar problems, and its Government is trying to resolve them by
hiring an international firm for customs clearance. Traders, however, complain that so far
this has led to longer processing times.
VAT on imports in all three countries are broadly consistent with the destination
principle and stand at 20 percent.  Excise taxes are levied on alcohol, cigarettes, fuel,
passenger cars, and some consumption ("luxury") goods.
Export taxes had been abolished in all countries (in Azerbaijan in 2000).
All Caucasus countries license trade in sensitive and potentially dangerous
products, which is a normal procedure.  Azerbaijan maintains an extensive export
licensing system, which potentially could lead, and, by anecdotal evidence, does lead, to
corruption.
Georgia licenses the export of raw materials (wood and wood products, scrap,
metals, etc.), bringing about the same problems.  Evidence of such corruption in Georgia
includes the large discrepancy found between the values of its exports to Turkey in the
mirror statistics. For instance, the value of the 1998 exports to Turkey, as reported by
Georgia, was US$20.2 million.  At the same time, the same year's imports from Georgia,
as reported by Turkey, stood at US$91.0 million. Even if we add Armenia's exports to
Turkey (US$2.9 million) to Georgia's (since they may be recorded in Turkey as of the
Georgian origin), the difference will still be 3.9 times.  This large a discrepancy cannot be
explained by the difference in the valuation of exports and imports.
Armenia's trade regulations are quite liberal. No unnecessary export licensing is
required. In all three countries, there are usual (non-tariff) regulations on the quality and
certification of goods.
The major obstacles to trade are unofficial, non-tariff barriers related to
corruption; little protection from extortion; and crimes against property.  As a result, in all
three countries, significant "facilitation" payments have to be made to ensure the reliable
and timely movements of consignments. The World Bank report Trade Facilitation in
the Caucasus asserts that, in Azerbaijan, "the movement of any consignment was
impossible without the prior provision of a facilitation payment"; in Georgia, the rent-
seeking behavior is of a random nature; and, in Armenia, it is less prevalent but still
significant. Extortion on the road is also common. The unofficial payments on the road
19are routinely included in transport tariffs.  According to anecdotal evidence, in the case of
Georgia, they account for from a quarter to a third of the highway tariffs.
3.  Trade after Conflict Resolution
In this chapter, we discuss the potential for trade in the region in the event of
conflict resolution. We focus on non-energy trade here.  Energy trade is relegated to the
next chapter.
3.1.  Export Opportunities
There are three missing export flows in the region -- Armenia to Azerbaijan,
Azerbaijan to Armenia, and Armenia to Turkey (which is, formally speaking, positive
but, for all practical purposes, zero) and one restricted export flow -- Turkey to Armenia.
In order to put into perspective the current and potential export flows in industrial
products outside of natural resources, we applied the gravity model developed by Baldwin
to assess the potential integration of East and West European trade 4. Baldwin's model
was estimated on trade flows among the EC, EFTA, the USA, Canada, Japan, and Turkey
using the random effect method with maximum likelihood correction for first-order
autoregressive error. The model has the following form:
Ln Xij = -17.5 - 0.88 Ln Dy + 0. 77 Ln Pop i +1.16 Ln GDPCapi + 0.  79 Ln Popj
(12)  (11)  (26)  (13)  (25)
+1.22n GDPCapj + 0.28 Adj] + 0.53 Block 0j,
(16)  (2)  (3)
R2 =  0.99, DW= 2.39, t-statistics in parenthesis,
where i is the exporting country,j is the importing country, Pop is population, GDPCa  p
is per capita GDP (in PPP), Adj is the dummy for adjacent countries, and Block is a
dummy that takes on the value if the trading partners belong to a trading block.
The distances are straight lines between the capital cities ("as the crow flies").
GDP (in PPP) is expressed in 1985 U.S. dollars based on the Penn World Tables.
We used this model to calculate export flows among the three South Caucasus
countries and their major partners, further referred to as "potential".  The countries' GI)P
(in PPP) for 1996, developed by the European Comparison Project, were rebased to 1985
US dollars. In order to be compatible with the Baldwin's model, the results were
converted into 1996 US dollars.
4  Baldwin (1994).
20Table 6.  Average annual (1995-98) and potential exports
Trading  Exports (USD million)  Partner's share (sample = 100), %
partners
Actual  Potential  Potential!  Actual  Potential  Potential -
Actual ratio  Actual
Armenia's
exports to:
Azerbaijan  --  3,276  --  --  0.6  0.6
Georgia  7,478  22,214  3.0  3.3  4.0  0.7
Turkey  4,692  35,641  7.6  2.0  6.4  4.4
EU  63,223  230,768  3.7  27.6  41.6  14.0
Russia  72,457  79,530  1.1  31.6  14.3  -17.3
USA  5,916  101,948  17.2  2.6  18.4  15.8
Iran  38,233  44,313  1.2  16.7  8.0  -8.7
Other CIS  37,304  37,396  2.4  16.3  6.7  -9.5
Subtotal  229,303  555,087  2.4  100  100  --
Azerbaijan's
exports to:
Arnenia  --  3,234  --  --  0.3  0.3
Georgia  86,813  14,575  0.2  14.1  1.5  -12.5
Turkey  60,654  35,609  0.6  9.8  3.8  -6.1
EU  92,900  384,419  4.1  15.1  40.6  25.6
Russia  124,475  205,833  1.7  20.2  21.8  1.6
USA  4,808  171,376  35.6  0.8  18.1  17.3
Iran  161,604  62,798  0.4  26.2  6.6  -19.6
Other CIS  85,038  68,172  0.8  13.8  7.2  -6.6
Subtotal  616,292  946,018  1.5  100.0  100.0  0.0
Georgia's
exports to:
Arnenia  18,869  21,534  1.1  10.9  1.8  -9.1
Azerbaijan  20,148  14,312  0.7  11.6  1.2  -10.4
Turkey  29,927  73,905  2.5  17.2  6.2  -11.1
EU  20,255  495,236  16.5  11.7  41.3  29.6
Russia  56,892  238,154  11.8  32.7  19.8  -12.9
USA  4,322  211,939  3.7  2.5  17.7  15.2
Iran  2,328  63,346  14.7  1.3  5.3  3.9
Other CIS  21,100  81,761  35.1  12.1  6.8  -5.3
Subtotal  173,841  1,200,186  6.9  100.0  100.0  0.0
21Table 7. Average annual (1995-98) and potential exports under growth scenario
Trading  Exports (USD million)
partners
Actual  Potential  Potential/Ac  Potential




Azerbaijan  --  6,660  --  6,660
Georgia  7,478  43,989  5.9  36,511
Turkey  4,692  65,706  14.0  61,014
EU  63,223  389,802  6.2  326,579
Russia  72,457  106,988  1.5  34,531
USA  5,916  178,417  30.2  172,501
Iran  38,233  75,805  2.0  37,572
Other CIS  37,304  61,485  1.6  24,181
Subtotal  229,303  928,853  4.1  699,550(
Azerbaijan's
exports to:
Armenia  --  4,577  --  4,577
Georgia  86,813  20,197  0.2  -66,616
Turkey  60,654  45,937  0.8  -14,717
EU  92,900  454,389  4.9  361,489
Russia  124,475  193,765  1.6  69,290
USA  4,808  209,877  43.7  205,069
Iran  161,604  75,174  0.5  -86,430
Other CIS  85,038  79,158  0.9  -5,880
Subtotal  616,292  1,083,075  1.8  466,783
Georgia's
exports to:
Armenia  18,869  30,474  1.6  11,605
Azerbaijan  20,148  20,357  1.0  209
Turkey  29,927  95,341  3.2  65,414
EU  20,255  585,376  28.9  565,121
Russia  56,892  224,191  3.9  167,299
USA  4,322  259,552  60.1  255,230
Iran  2,328  75,829  32.6  73,501
Other CIS  21,100  93,877  4.4  72,777
Subtotal  173,841  1,384,997  8.0  1,211,156
In our model, export volumes are represented by total exports.  This has certain
disadvantage since, according to the theoretical justifications of the gravity model, the
22model describes the best trade in manufactured products.  It is poor at explaining trade in
natural resources such as oil or agricultural products, since natural resource flows are
determined by the exporters' endowments rather than GDP. However, due to data
limitations, we have been unable to derive reliable estimates for manufactured exports.
Based on Table 6, we may conclude that all three South Caucasus countries tend
to export less than predicted by the gravity model.  The overall ratio of potential to actual
exports range from 1.5 for Azerbaijan to 2.4 for Armenia to 6.9 for Georgia. (These
ratios would, in fact, be even higher since current estimates do not take into account trade
in agricultural products, energy, and other non-manufactured goods.)
The low export volumes can be partly explained by the physical restrictions on the
movement of goods. However, a more important reason for weak export performance is
the dearth of internationally competitive goods produced in the region outside of natural
resources.
Geographically, the South Caucasus countries tend to trade sufficiently with
politically friendly neighbors, the CIS countries and undertrade with the EU, the USA,
and hostile neighbors.  Neighboring markets are less competitive and have weaker quality
requirements for imports than sophisticated European and American markets.  Past
traditions of regional trade also facilitate short-haul trade flows.
While regional trade may be boosted by conflict settlements, massive exports to
the developed nations would not happen without a major industrial restructuring.
With higher income levels, trade potential would indeed be higher. Table 7
presents potential export volumes under the World Bank projections of the GDP levels
and country populations in 2002.  Under this scenario, the ratio of potential to current
trade would increase to 1.8 for Azerbaijan, 4.1 for Armenia, and 8.0 for Georgia. The
largest potential gains would be for exports to the EU and the USA.  In case of
Azerbaijan, a number of regional partners might see a reduction in exports, redirected to
other destinations.
The above analysis suggests the following magnitudes of missing exports (the
lower bound represents exports flows under the GDP levels in 1996; the higher bound
uses the projected 2002 GDP levels): Armenia to Azerbaijan - US$3.2-6.7 million,
Armenia to Turkey - US$35.6-65.7 million, Azerbaijan to Armenia - US$3.2-4.6
million.
A number of case studies show that export opportunities can be associated with
the opening of borders.  The World Bank study on the prospects for Armenia exports 5
indicated the advantage of products with high value-to-weight ratio, in order to overcome
the geographic factor. However, if regional borders open, the weight restriction may be
relaxed.  For instance, there may be a good market for Armenia's building materials
5 Hurwitz (1995).
23industry (cement, building stone, tile) in Turkey and Azerbaijan.  At the present time,
capacity utilization in the industry is extremely low due to low domestic demand and
physical barriers to trade: Cement plants are used at below 20 percent of capacity, and
stone and tile production stands at about five percent of capacity.  If the production
capacity were more fully utilized, production could increase by US$40 to 80 million a
year.  Also, by lowering transport costs, existing exports of low value-to-weight produc':s,
such as non-ferrous metal (copper, molybdenum, zinc) ores, concentrates, and synthetic
rubber would become more profitable and go up in volume.
Supply side
Outside natural resources and semi-finished products produced on the Soviet-era,
plants, the South Caucasus countries have a rather limited export base.  Necessary
conditions for improved export performance include industrial restructuring and large
new investment, especially foreign (which facilitates access to foreign markets and places
local producers in international distribution networks). Neither will happen without a
major improvement in the business climate.  Recent international surveys, including the
World Bank/EBRD survey, indicate grave problems in this area. The business climate
rankings of the South Caucasus countries are consistently placed at the bottorm  of the CIS
and transition economies as a whole.  Official corruption and red tape are regular
occurrences, property rights are poorly protected, and the agency problems abound.  A
marked improvement in the business climate and in its perception by investors will take a
long time, if ever.
Also, the usual problems of the post-Soviet industrial sector have to be addressed,
including/especially insufficient working capital, managerial and marketing problems,
incomplete restructuring, etc. For instance, Armenia's massive engineering sector has
largely lost its markets in the CIS, mostly Russia.  Equipment and parts for the defense
sector, as well as relatively low-quality industrial and household equipment, composed
traditional engineering exports.  The markets for most of these products have ceased to
exist. It is the problems with the identification of new (that is, old geographically but
very much changed) markets and the inflexible product mix that make it very difficult tc,
restart exports to the CIS. Therefore, a mere reduction of physical trade barriers is not
enough to bring about needed revolutionary changes in export performance.
If progress towards the improvement of the business climate and industrial
restructuring remains weak, it is doubtful that the potential of export creation will be fully
realized.
Trade in energy and natural resources presents the most obvious export
opportunities. It is discussed in detail in Section 4.2.  In sum, the Armenian exports to
Turkey could increase by as much as US$230 million or more, thanks to the exports of
electricity and construction materials.  This figure equals total Armenian exports in 1999.
24Table 8. Comparison of Selected Wholesale Prices in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey,
1998
(As percent of Turkey)
Commodities  Azerbaijan  Armenia  Georgia
Energy
Products
Average  20%  44%  32%
Electric power  KWh  33%  39%  33%
Gasoline  Ton  18%  32%  29%
Diesel oil  Ton  27%  49%
Natural gas  M3  10%  55%  33%
Agricultural Products
Average  104%
Wheat  KG  67%  111%  101%
Barley  KG  131%  85%
Sunflower seed  KG  218%  89%
Beefand  veal  KG  16%  34%
Poultry  KG  113%  158%
Wool  KG  6%  33%  42%
Eggs  Unit  123%  163%  85%
Butter  KG  41%  46%
Crystal Sugar  KG  69%  55%  61%
Wheat flour  KG  87%  144%  177%
Fertilizers
Average  74%  67%  149%
Urea  Ton  103%  84%  46%
DAP  Ton  42%  50%  61%
TSP  Ton  77%  177%
Timber
Average  62%  36%
Heavy logs  M3  65%  60%
Plywood  M2  13%
Sawnwood  M3  59%
Copper  Ton  51%
Portland Cement  KG  126%  78%  62%
25Table 9.  Comparison of Selected Retail Food Prices in Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Turkey, 1998
(As percent of Turkey)
Products  Azerbaijan  Armenia  Georgia
Veal  KG  50%  42%  52%
Pork  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Margarine  KG  86%  78%  108%
Butter  KG  41%  37%  42%
Milk  L  72%  45%  71%
Eggs  Unit  125%  123%  112%
Bread, wheat  KG  80%  69%  67%
Crystal sugar  KG  82%  67%  73%
Potatoes  KG  169%  96%  141%
Average  88%  70%  83%
Sources:  Statistical agencies of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.
Azerbaijani exports to Armenia could reach US$120 million, increasing total
exports by US$100 million6, which equals ten percent of total exports.
3.2.  Price Levels
Fully realizing that domestic price levels are determined by a multitude of factors,
many of which fall outside foreign trade (including the exchange rates of local currencies,
taxes, internal transport costs, wholesale trader markups, etc.), we still would like to
compare and put into perspective the price levels in the three South Caucasus countries.
Tables 8 and 9 present the comparative average prices of main commodity groups,
including fuel and energy, agriculture and food, investment, and intermediate goods,
among Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. As these data refer to 1998, they do
not take into account the different currency devaluation situations in the South Caucasus
countries after the Russia crisis: Georgia has significantly devalued its currency after
1998, while Armenia and Azerbaijan have not.  Therefore, the relative prices in Georgia
today vis-a-vis Armnenia  and Azerbaijan would be lower today than in 1998.
Nevertheless, the above data might give some interesting insights.
As the data suggest, with respect to Azerbaijan, Armenian energy and agricultural
prices are twice as high.  Prices for fertilizers and timber are on par.  The price of cement
in Armenia is a third lower than it is in Azerbaijan and a fifth lower than in Turkey.
6  Export  flows  worth  US$20  million  could be rerouted  to Armenia  from  more distant  destinations.
26With respect to Georgia, Armenian energy prices are higher, and agricultural
prices are at the same level.
Retail food prices are lower in Armenia than in its Caucasus neighbors, which
may indicate lower retail markups.
The above data suggest that trade blockades play a role in pushing Armenia's
energy prices upward.  High energy prices constitute an implicit tax on both production
and consumption.
High agricultural prices in both Armenia and Georgia with respect to Azerbaijan
reflect somewhat inferior agroclimatic conditions in the former two countries.  Whilst
there are no formal trade barriers between Georgia and Azerbaijan, and the cost of
transporting agricultural products between Azerbaijan and its neighbors does not exceed a
quarter of the unit value, the price differential between the two countries remains very
large. This situation may be explained by informal barriers and the underdeveloped,
disjointed nature of agricultural markets in the region.
If trade in the region frees up, Armenia would benefit from lower energy prices.
At the same time, the agricultural sectors of Armenia and Georgia would likely
come under competitive pressure from Azerbaijan, if the regional market become more
integrated. Increased export opportunities would be beneficial for the depressed
Azerbaijani agriculture but potentially could negatively affect rural incomes and rural
poverty in the other Caucasus countries.
The large price differential of Armenian cement with respect to both Azerbaijan
and Turkey signals that Armenia could restart its traditional exports of construction
materials to the neighbors, despite the high transportation costs of these products.
The potential benefits arising from a domestic price decrease could be shared
between consumers, producers, and traders.  Consumers will increase their utility level,
producers will enjoy lower input prices (e.g., energy) but face increased foreign
competition, and traders might absorb part of the savings as higher margins.
3.3.  Transport savings
Through our interviews with transportation firms and traders, we obtained
transport costs for the main trading commodities; we also assessed the economic benefits
arising from shorter transport routes that would be open in a normal political situation.
The difference between current and optimal costs constitutes deadweight losses incurred
by firms (through lower profit margins) and households (through higher prices).  Two
methods were used to estimate these losses.  We would like to emphasize that these
estimates are based on the currently observed volumes of trade.  The opening of borders
27Table 10. Economy on transportation of Turkish exports to Azerbaijan, 1999 data
Transp.  Value,  Transp. costs,  Economy, 000 $
costs, % of  000 $
UV
Commodities  Min  Max  000$  Min  Max  Min  Max
Total  73601.7 5223.7  16035.1 522.4  1603.5
Equipment for TV and  5  10  10913.2  545.7  1091.3  54.6  109.1
radio transmission
Electric power  6973.9  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Sugar and granulated  10  25  5492.2  549.2  1373.1  54.9  137.3
sugar
Iron structures and parts  10  50  4661.6  466.2  2330.8  46.6  233.1
Equipment for wheat  10  50  4213.1  421.3  2106.6  42.1  210.7
processing
Wheat flour  10  25  3512.6  351.3  878.2  35.1  87.8
Refiigerators and freezers  5  10  3371.9  168.6  337.2  16.9  33.7
Aluminum structures and  10  50  3060.8  306.1  1530.4  30.6  153.0
parts
Package equipment  5  10  2887.4  144.4  288.7  14.4  28.9
Synthetic fabrics  5  10  2708.9  135.4  270.9  13.5  27.1
Margarine  10  25  2543.2  254.3  635.8  25.4  63.6
Furniture and parts  5  10  2330.6  116.5  233.1  11.7  23.3
Birds eggs in shell  10  25  2077.8  207.8  519.5  20.8  51.9
Plastic construction  10  50  1978.8  197.9  989.4  19.8  98.9
comm.
Synthetic washing  10  25  1851.7  185.2  462.9  18.5  46.3
preparation
Other sweets  10  25  1515.4  151.5  378.9  15.2  37.9
Sunflower oil  10  25  1444.3  144.4  361.1  14.4  36.1
Confectioneryproducts  10  25  1187.5  118.8  296.9  11.9  29.7
Paper products for  5  10  1178  58.9  117.8  5.9  11.8
housing
Ventilators  5  10  1172.5  58.6  117.3  5.9  11.7
Cars- new  5  10  1094.8  54.7  109.5  5.5  10.9
Soap  10  25  959  95.9  239.8  9.6  24.0
Water pumps  5  10  921.5  46.1  92.2  4.6  9.2
Other conditioners  5  10  867.4  43.4  86.7  4.3  8.7
Doors wood  10  50  867  86.7  433.5  8.7  43.4
Cosmetics  5  10  822.5  41.1  82.3  4.1  8.2
Tea  10  25  730.6  73.1  182.7  7.3  18.3
Macaroni products  10  25  535  53.5  133.8  5.4  13.4
Cooling compressors  5  10  512.6  25.6  51.3  2.6  5.1
Potatoes  10  25  450  45.0  112.5  4.5  11.3
Fruits and vegetables juice  10  25  447.1  44.7  111.8  4.5  11.2
Garlic and onion  10  25  318.8  31.9  79.7  3.2  8.0
28would certainly push trade volumes higher, but it is difficult to predict by how much.
Thus, the estimates below should be considered conservative.
Method 1 uses the minimum and maximum estimates of the shares of transport
costs in the unit values of specific commodities given by traders and the estimates of
transport cost reduction from realigning routes by transportation companies.  Hence, the
estimates of transport savings are derived.  If si is the share of transport cost in unit value,
ei is the potential economy in transport costs, and Vi is the value of trade (imports or
exports) of commodity i, then total economy equals 2i (Vi s i e d.
Method 2 is based on the information about transport costs per unit of cargo (such
as container, truckload, rail car) provided by transport companies and trade volumes in
physical units compiled by the statistics agencies.  This method will also gives an interval
estimate because actual loading factors (i.e., how many tons on average are loaded in a
container or in a truck) are unknown and we have to assume minimal and maximum
loading factors. If ti is transport cost per unit of cargo, ei is the potential economy in
transport costs, and H is the physical volume of trade, then total economy equals
Li  (Hi t i e d.
Table 10 shows an example of such calculations using Method 1.Transport
savings arising from opening borders presented below are obtained with these methods.
Armenia
Armenia would benefit from straightening two circuitous routes - with Turkey
and Iran - and from using Turkish ports for transshipments. Arrnenia's use of the
Georgian territory for transit will significantly decrease.  Trucking costs between Armenia
and Turkey would at least halve as a result.  This estimate does not include general cargo,
most of which would continue to go via sea and railway rather than by road.  A
percentage of general cargo might be sent via road for crossborder and short distance
trade.  However, since no current estimates are available, we did not attempt to gauge the
magnitude of this flow and so kept the estimates on the conservative side.  The transport
savings for Turkish imports into Armenia vary between US$0.6 and 0.8 million, based on
the 1999 data. However, if the higher, 1998 trade volumes are assumed, the savings will
rise to US$0.9 to 1.2 million.  Armenian exports to Turkey are currently very small, so no
significant savings could be achieved at these low volumes.
In addition to savings in money, the direct link between Armenian and Turkish
road systems would increase the availability, predictability, and reliability of shipping
services. These features, currently unavailable for South Caucasus exporters/importers,
are as important as transportation costs - if not more so.  The benefits will be shared by
Armenia and its Caucasus neighbors.  In this case, Armenia would become a transit
country rather than "the end of the line".
29If the Turkish port of Trabson were to be used for the transshipments of Annenian
trade goods instead of the Georgian port of Poti, the ground share of container transport
costs would decrease by one-fourth. General cargo would probably continue to flow
through Poti, since Trabson has no rail link.  It is more economical to use rail cars than
trucks for general cargo. Currently, about 5,000 containers per year pass through Poti on
their way to/from Armenia.  At a transshipment cost of $1,400 for a 20 foot container and
a $1,800 cost for a 40 foot container, the savings would range from US$1.8 to 2.0 million
a year.
If the Turkish port Mersin on the Mediterranean coast were used instead of Poti., it
will help to eliminate transshipments from/to Mediterranean ports en route to North
America, West Europe, and Asia7. Estimates indicate that this might result in as much as
a 65 percent transport savings for general cargo8. However, the inability of Turkish
railways to handle the massive transit of general cargo raises doubts about the viability of
this scheme.
Ground transportation costs to/from Iran would go down by at least one-third if
the road via Nakhichevan rather than Megri is used.  This would result in savings ranging
from US$3.6 to 4.8 million for Iranian imports to Armenia and from US$0.4 to 0.8
million for Armenian exports to Iran.
Total transportation savings for Armenia would amount to US$6.4-8.4 million.
The 1999 BOP shows a US$63.6 million debit in freight services and a US$30.3 million
deficit.  Hence, the savings would decrease the debit by 10-13 percent and the deficit by
21-28 percent.
The effect on Russian transit to Armenia via Georgia would be only minor, since
the majority of Russian exports are energy (natural gas and nuclear fuel), which do not
use sea or rail routes.  The transit of Armenian exports to Russia currently sent via
Azerbaijani railway through Georgian intermediate addresses would become easier and
quicker to arrange if the intermediary is eliminated. Substantial cost savings would arise
only if Armenia were to enter railway tariff agreements with Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan
Opening the road between Azerbaijan and Turkey via Arnenia  would reduce the
transport cost between the two countries by ten percent.  Trade is currently conducted via
Georgia or Iran.  Not all trade flows should be included in the calculations of potential
transport savings. Twenty-nine percent of trade goods are delivered by sea and railway
via Georgia rather than by road, since it is mainly general cargo, for which road
transportation is not economical.  Also, it is unrealistic to assume that transit through
7  The shallow-water  port Poti  cannot  accept  large  ocean-going  vessels  necessitating  transshipments  in
smnaller,  so-called  feeder,  ships  from/to  Mediterranean  ports. Container  ships  are smaller  and can enter  Poti.
They  do not require  transshipments  in the Mediterranean.  Therefore,  the above  estimates  refer to general
cargo  rather  than containers.
s Hurwitz'  estimate  quoted  in Transport  Sector  Review  (1995).
30Georgia and Iran will cease completely. Therefore, we have applied a correction factor of
0.5 to cost economy estimates. The final estimates range from US$0.5 to 1.2 million for
imports and from US$0.2 to 0.6 million for exports (based on 1999 data). Total savings
are in the range of 0.7-1.8 million dollars, or 1-3 percent of the 1999 debit in freight
services in the BOP.
Georgia
As mentioned above, Georgia is likely to lose a part of its transit traffic to/from
Arnenia  if the Turkish border with Armenia opens.  Mostly container traffic would be
affected. Much of long-haul general cargo would probably continue to travel through
Georgia by rail and sea, since the Turkish railways are not likely to be used for mass
transit of goods due to their low technical capacities.
Using the data provided by the authorities of the port of Poti, we have estimated
current container traffic between Arnenia and the rest of the world through Georgia at
5,000 units per year.  Interviewed forwarders have estimated that, if Turkish ports were
used instead of Poti, the road portion of transportation would cost 25 percent less. At the
current cost of $1,400 per 20 foot container and $1,800 per 40 foot, and the estimated 80
percent share of 20 foot containers, this amounts to a total potential savings of US$1.9
million.  If a quarter of the traffic still continued to use Poti, the estimate would stand at
US$1.4 million.  The resulting loss of transit revenues to Georgia would range between
US$5.6 and 7.4 million dollars, or 16-21 percent of the surplus in cargo services in the
BOP.
4. Trade in Energy
4.1.  Current Flows
Energy flows have immense importance in the region.  Armenia and Georgia are
the importers of petroleum and natural gas.  The economies of these countries are very
dependent on fuel imports. The disruption of fuel supplies in the early 1990s brought
these economies to nearly total collapse.  Armenia has large surplus electric power
capacities.  Azerbaijan has relatively large proven resources of oil and gas but is a net
importer of power.  (This happens not because of a lack of generating capacities but due
to disruptions in the fuel supply to power stations caused by payment problem.)  It should
be noted that all countries in the region export and import electric power on a swap basis
in order to smoothen seasonal and peak differences.
The major energy flows in the region are as follows.
Armenia imports natural gas and nuclear fuel from Russia. Petroleum products
are imported from a variety of destinations, including Iran, Georgia, East and West
Europe, and, recently, Turkey. It exports electricity to Georgia and  ran.
31Georgia imports natural gas from Russia, oil and petroleum products from
Azerbaijan, Iran, and the Gulf states. Georgia exports electric power to Turkey,
Azerbaijan, and a very small amount to Russia (it is, in fact, a net importer).
Azerbaijan imports electric power from Turkey, Iran, Georgia, and Russia.  It
exports oil and petroleum products to Russia, Turkey, Iran, Georgia, the Gulf states, and
outside of the region, to the CIS, Europe, and other destinations.  Azerbaijan exports
electric power to Russia, Iran, Georgia, being a net importer of power.
4.2.  Flows after Conflict Resolution
4.2.1.  Electric Power
The greatest efficiency would be achieved if the South Caucasus countries and
their neighbors operated as one system. This would economize particularly on generation
capacity investments.  It would also allow for more economic dispatch.  For instance,
Armenia sometimes spills water at its low-cost hydro stations, given the lack of export
opportunities, in order to run its nuclear capacity at its minimum efficient level. While
Armenia is doing that, Georgia might be running the high-cost thermal units at
Gardabani.
There are a number of reasons why the systems are not integrated.  One is
straightforward: Annenia cannot trade electricity directly with Turkey or Azerbaijan for
political reasons (even though Turkey has electricity shortages).  Another is more
complex: For technical reasons, Armenia and Georgia cannot safely operate in parallel
with Russia and Iran unless Azerbaijan joins in.  This requires a level of cooperation
between Armenia and Azerbaijan that has not yet been achieved.  Since Armenia operates
in parallel with Iran, and Georgia with Russia, this restricts Armenian electricity trade
with Georgia.
Armenia by far has the most excess generating capacities in the region.  This
capacity can be used if new markets for energy (especially Turkey) are opened. An
increase in power exports of Georgia and Azerbaijan will be rather small.  The excess
annual average generating capacity of Arnenia  is conservatively estimated at 1,000 MW
That will allow exports of over US$190 million worth of energy at the average unit value
for Armenian exports in 1999 of 2.8 cents per KWh.
Armenia's power export has a high import content (natural gas and nuclear fuel
currently imported from Russia).  The import content of the above additional power
generation would stand at US$100 million a year.  If the unit values of gas decrease by 25
percent (in the case of the substitution of Russian gas by Azerbaijani), the import content
would go down to US$80 million.  This number will go further down if the efficiency of
generation increases due to better use of capacity.
The realization of the above export potential is dependent on investment needed
to upgrade and replace the aging and neglected power generation capacities and
32distribution systems, including the proposed closure of the nuclear plant.  According to
World Bank staff estimates, medium-term investment requirements in the sector amount
to US$300 million.
4.2.2.  Natural gas
Currently, Russia and Azerbaijan are the main gas suppliers in the region.
In the case of conflict resolution, Armenia may fully or partially substitute
Russian natural gas with gas from Azerbaijan. Though the price of natural gas is difficult
to predict due to the localized and ad hoc nature of the gas market (especially in the CIS),
lower transport costs would probably result in a 25 percent savings, 9 or about US$25
million a year. For Azerbaijan, this would mean US$100 million in extra exports.
However, the existing infrastructure has not been used in almost ten years and the
technical condition of the pipelines may call for investments, or even for new pipeline
construction. Therefore, these savings look uncertain.
Longer-term prospects for Azerbaijani gas are related to the Turkish market.
Turkey is the only reliable paying gas market in the region, and there is high competition
for this market among regional producers.  The gas markets in the CIS suffer from non-
payment problems.  Turkey has entered into an agreement to purchase 16 billion cubic
meters delivered via the proposed Trans-Caspian pipeline that is likely to traverse
Turkmenistan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
There is much argument about the prospective gas pipeline routes, which will
determine what countries will benefit from gas transit.  The possible transport of
Azerbaijani gas to Turkey requires multi-billion dollar investments and cannot bring any
short-term effects.
4.2.3.  Oil and petroleum products
The short-term effects of peace on crude oil transit will be trivial.  The only
existing pipeline runs through Georgia. Any new pipelines will require large investments
and a long construction time.  After much debate over the possible routes for transporting
Caspian oil, in October 2000, Azerbaijan and a group of foreign sponsors (including
companies from the UK, Norway, Turkey, Japan, and the U.S.) signed an agreement of
financing oil pipeline from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. The
US$2.4 billion pipeline with an annual capacity of 17 million tons of crude is expected to
be completed in 2004.  Nevertheless, the economic viability of the project is still to be
evaluated. This pipeline would traverse Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.
Petroleum products are affected by closed borders in a qualitatively similar manner to
general consumer goods and intermediates traded in the region.  The price-raising effect
comes from circuitous transport routes.  However, there is an extra dimension of non-
existing trade.  The prime example would be the export of oil products
9 According to Trade Facilitation (2000).
33Table 11. Selected potential effects of trade normalization in South Caucasus
(U.S. Dollars Million)
Armenia  Azerbaijan  Georgia
Transport savings  6.4-8.4  0.7-1.8
Savings from using
lower-cost energy  45
Missing exports  268.9-342.4  103.2-104.6
Including:
gravity model  38.9-72.4  3.2-4.6
natural resources/
energy  255-296  100





imports  220.3-315.8  103.9-  106.4
As percent of 1999
trade deficit  38-54  25 - 26
Loss of transit
revenues  7.4
As percent of 1999
trade deficit  1.4
Source: Author's calculations.
from Azerbaijan to Armenia. The sale of Azerbaijani oil products to Armenia using the
same terms as they used with other countries, would lead to a cost reduction of 25
percent,'0 or over US$20 million.  These savings result from more than merely straitening
supply routes to Armenia, meaning that Azerbaijani exports will probably replace those
of other countries. However, Azerbaijan has production constraints on the volume of its
petroleum exports and, in any case, would be able to export all it wants.  Therefore, it
cannot be stated that there is a potential for increasing Azerbaijani export volumes thanks
to the opening of the Armenian fuel market.
5.  Effects on the BOP
This chapter sums up the potential benefits of trade normalization developed in
the previous chapters.
Ibid.
34The estimates (see Table 11) are on the conservative side and represent only a part
of potential short-term benefits.
Armenia would annually save US$6-8 million on the transport costs of non-
energy imports and US$45 million on switching the flows of natural gas and petroleum
products to new sources. Though this reduction in transportation services would be
shared between domestic and foreign providers, most of it would reduce current deficit,
because foreign transport companies dominate the market and their services are shown as
debit in the BOP.
The potential increase in exports would range from US$269 to 342 million a year,
more than doubling total exports.  At the same time, the complementary imports
necessary to sustain this increase in exports would stand at around US$100 million. The
resulting improvement in BOP would exceed US$220 million, or 38 percent of the
current trade deficit.
The potential new export volume equals 15 - 19 percent of GDP.  However,
exports are likely to have a multiplier effect on GDP.  Assuming a (modest) multiplier of
2.01 , the increase in exports may lead to up to 30 - 38 percent of the GDP growth.
Impressive as it is, these estimates fall far short of the widespread expectations
about potential economic perfornance  in the case of trade liberalization in the region. On
more than one occasion, the author has encountered local economists and officials
projecting doubling GDP.  Without profound (and protracted) economic restructuring,
these expectations are hardly realistic.
Azerbaijan could increase its exports by US$100 million, or 11 percent of the
current level, slashing the trade deficit by a quarter.  As a result, GDP would increase up
to five percent.
Georgia might face a reduction of transit through its territory. Nevertheless, it is
unlikely to exceed a quarter of the freight service surplus in the BOP, or 1.5 percent of
trade deficit. At the same time, the country would benefit from the effects of regional
cooperation. The most obvious example would be the integration of the electric power
systems that would bring about large efficiency gains.
6.  North-South transit
This chapter takes up (the highly debated) issue of possible strategic changes in
trade flows from the dominant East-West to include currently less important North-South
direction of trade.
"  For example, Beilock (1999) assuned exports-to-GDP multiplicator for Armenia at 3.0.
35It is tempting to think that, when the countries in the region drastically increase
their trade with the Gulf states, supported by the existing (but currently blocked) railway,
the currently dominant East-West trade flows would be supplemented with the North-
South flows. This new route might be also thought of as a transit path to Russia and
Central Asia.
This scenario, however, has many potential problems making it very hard to firmly
justify it at this time.  The Nakhichevan-Iran rail link, even when used during Soviet
times, had a small cargo capacity. In the past decade, the unused infrastructure has fallen
into disrepair and has been vandalized.  Significant investments are now needed to restart
even a modest regular service.  To update this link sufficiently to handle higher cargo
volumes, investrnents must increase manifold.
Another example of North-South route is the highway between Iran and Azerbaijan.
It is currently used to link the Persian Gulf (Iranian port Bandar-Abbas) with the CIS
railway system. Highway transport costs are low due to cheap fuel prices in Iran, and the
reliability of service is good thanks to Iran's quality road grid and highly reputable
trucking companies.  Nevertheless, there are no transit flows at present.  Russia is better
served by northern Black Sea ports and Central Asia -- by Poti and railway.
Nevertheless, if and when such a transit flow might emerge is an open question.
Geography might suggest such a possibility in the future, but it must be supplemented by
infrastructure development.  There is interest in this issue among such countries as
Russia, Iran, and India, which has recently signed a protocol on the development of the
North-South transport corridor through the Caspian Sea.  A land transport corridor might
also draw some attention in the future. Another major transport initiative, TRACECA,
aims at developing a East-West corridor through the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea to
Asia. If it is successful, the developed infrastructure would greatly reduce the capital
requirements for the North-South corridor.
7. Conclusions
Current situation
The South Caucasus countries have been maintaining high trade deficits.  Their
main exports are base commodities and energy. Tariff barriers to trade are modest.  Non-
tariff, unofficial barriers constitute more pronounced obstacles to trade.
Disrupted traditional transportation routes stifle the export and import capabilities
of Armenia and Azerbaijan.  At the same time, Georgia enjoys some benefits of higher-
than-normal transit through its territory.  Trade in some important commodities does not
exist, including the export of gas from Azerbaijan to Arnenia  and of electricity from
Armenia to Turkey.
Transit fees in Arnenia  and Georgia constitute a significant portion of transport
tariffs thus further raising the costs of trade.
36Trade blockades contribute to the elevated prices of energy in Armenia, which are
double the Azerbaijani levels.  High energy prices constitute an implicit tax on both
production and consumption.  Regional agricultural trade is very weak despite the
differences in prices and endowments.
Nevertheless, trade restrictions have had a tendency to ease over time.  Partners in
the immediate trading neighborhood, in many cases, have founds ways to resume trade,
albeit at extra cost (i.e., Turkey-Armenia trade via Georgia, Arrnenia-Russia trade via
Azerbaijan). Overseas flows have also established reliable routes.  As a result, the freight
factor in Annenia, which provide a broad measure of the relative cost of transporting
trade goods, has decreased.
Applying a gravity model to the regional trade, we concluded that the South
Caucasus countries tend to trade sufficiently with the CIS countries and politically
friendly neighbors and undertrade with the EU, the USA, and hostile neighbors. It may
be explained by well-established trade links and by weaker competition and lower quality
requirements for goods in the CIS markets than in more sophisticated European and
American markets.
Peace benefits
If the blockades are lifted, trade distortions will be alleviated, bringing about
positive short-term welfare effects including: (i) more rational trade flows; (ii)
resumption (or a major increase) of regional trade in some major commodities such as
energy; and (iii) lower prices and/or higher profit margins on some important
consumption and production goods.
Potential peace benefits are especially high for Annenia.  First, Armenia could
more than double its total exports if the Turkish and Azerbaijani markets are opened.
This would erase almost a half of Armenia's dangerously high trade deficit and would
lead to a 30 percent GDP growth in the short-run. Due to a high import content of its
potential exports, Armenia would generate a strong demand for imports, offering trade
opportunities for regional partners.  Second, considerable savings would result from
straightening transport routes-and switching to closer supply sources.  Armenia could
save over US$50 million a year, which would more than erase the deficit in freight
services in the BOP and relieve the pressure on its domestic prices, especially energy.
Azerbaijan could increase its exports by US$100 million, or 11 percent of the
current level, reducing trade deficit by a quarter.  As a result, GDP would increase up to
five percent.  It could also benefit from some transport savings arising from exports and
imports.
Georgia might face a reduction of transit through its territory.  Nevertheless, it is
unlikely to exceed a quarter of the freight service surplus in the BOP, or 1.5 percent of
37trade deficit.  At the same time, the country would benefit from the effects of regional
cooperation.
Opening up the borders would bring positive systemic effects, especially in the
energy sector. The regional electric power system would achieve the greatest efficiency if
operated as one system.
A direct link between Armenian and Turkish road grids would improve
availability, predictability, and reliability of shipping services for all Caucasus countries.
The prospects for a North-South transit corridor across the South Caucasus are of
a longer-term nature and would require considerable investment, the economic efficiency
of which is not clear at this time.
A political settlement per se would not bring about immediate and drastic changes
in the overall economic performance in the South Caucasus, given the region's  current
poor business environment and its incomplete industrial restructuring.  Widespread
expectations to the contrary are hardly realistic. Too many overoptimistic projections of
peace benefits circulate in the region.
Thus, each country could benefit greatly from the following:
- hnprove the foreign trade international environment by better implementing the trade
agreements among the CIS countries and concluding new agreements with other trade
partners, especially Turkey and the EU;
- Open the Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani borders for trade.  WTO
membership and the bid of Turkey and Arnenia  to join the EU could be used to
facilitate the normalization of trade;
*  Include Armenia in the Xerox/Baku railway tariff agreements. Improve the state
regulation of railway firms to insure the effectiveness of international tariff
agreements;
*  Reduce transit fees on a reciprocal basis;
*  Eliminate the unofficial extortion on the road (especially, in Georgia and Azerbaijan  );
*  Streamline and increase efficiency of the customs; reduce corruption in customs
administration;
*  Equalize import taxation for all flows 12;
12 An  example  of discriminatory  taxation  of imports  can  be found  in  Armenia.  The  current  rules  exenmpt
physical  persons  for  VAT if the volume  is under  specified  threshold  while fully  tax legal  persons. The
finms  (legal  persons)  widely  use this loophole  to minimize  VAT  payments  by hiring  physical  persons  to
import  on their  behalf.
38*  Consider financial support for trade facilitation by international organizations,
including the World Bank, contingent on the progress towards conflict resolution.
Trade flow optimization will require investments even in the short-run, when only the
existing infrastructure is used.
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For each transport entering the RA territory ,which is registered in a foreign
country, the ecological charges are collected at the following rates:
TYPE OF TRANSPORT  AMOUNT (AMD)
for passenger car  2500
for bus with less thanl2  seats  5000
for bus with 12 and more than 12 seats  10000
for truck with up to 8 tons tonnage  5000
for truck with 8 - 20 tons tonnage  10000
for truck with 20 and more tons tonnage  15000
Transit fees
For any  quantity of  goods passing  transit by  the territory  of  the Republic  of
Annenia  an amount equal to US$20.00 is collected, except the  goods passing  for the
Republic of Georgia, for which an amount equal to US$100.00 is collected.
In accordance with the law of RA "On transit payment", transportation facilities
registered in  other  countries  for using  public  automobile  routes  of  the Republic  of
Armenia pay the following route tariffs for each entrance:
N/N  Type of vehicle  The amount of
the tariff (in
Drams)
1.  passenger cars with up to 7 seats  10 000
2.  buses with up to 13 seats  20 000
3.  buses with from 13 to 30 seats  40 000
4.  buses with 30 and more seats  60 000
5.  trucks and trailers with up to 1.5 tons carrying capacity  15 000
6.  trucks and trailers with from 1.5 to 3 tons carrying capacity  25 000
trucks
7.  trailers with from 3 to 5 tons carrying capacity  40 000
8.  trucks and trailers with from 5 to 10 tons carrying capacity  65 000
trucks
9.  trailers with  from  10 to 20 tons carrying  capacity  80 009
10.  trucks and trailers with from 20 to 36 tons carrying capacity  110 000
11.  trucks and trailers with 36 and more tons carrying capacity  150 000
41The route payment is collected by the Customs officers at Customhouses at the
entrance of transportation facilities registered in other countries on the territory of the
Republic of Armenia.
2.  Georgia
Road tax is levied on all foreign vehicles crossing the Georgian territory. The tax
depends on the type of vehicle and the weight of a cargo. If the vehicle is loaded above
its capacity, for each additional ton additional tax is paid.
Road tax schedule (for all foreign vehicles)
Vehicle type  Tax (GEL)  For each additional ton
Cars  60
Vans (up to 13 passenger seats)  115
Vans (13-30 passenger seats)  230
Buses (30+ passenger seats)  380
Trucks (up to 3 tons)  230  23 (10% of tax)
Trucks (3-10 tons)  380  38 (10% of tax)
Trucks (10-20 tons)  480  48 (10% of tax)
Trucks (20-40 tons)  650  32.5 (5% of tax)
Trucks (40+ tons)  880  44 (5% of tax)
Plus there is extra charge for each additional axle.
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